ref: 009439541d2c6e8af2596f8fb1b4df85861fd212
dir: /third_party/boringssl/src/crypto/x509/x_x509.c/
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
#include <assert.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include <openssl/obj.h>
#include <openssl/pool.h>
#include <openssl/thread.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include "../asn1/internal.h"
#include "../bytestring/internal.h"
#include "../internal.h"
#include "internal.h"
static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class = CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT;
ASN1_SEQUENCE_enc(X509_CINF, enc, 0) = {
ASN1_EXP_OPT(X509_CINF, version, ASN1_INTEGER, 0),
ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, serialNumber, ASN1_INTEGER),
ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, signature, X509_ALGOR),
ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, issuer, X509_NAME),
ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, validity, X509_VAL),
ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, subject, X509_NAME),
ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, key, X509_PUBKEY),
ASN1_IMP_OPT(X509_CINF, issuerUID, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 1),
ASN1_IMP_OPT(X509_CINF, subjectUID, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 2),
ASN1_EXP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_CINF, extensions, X509_EXTENSION, 3),
} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_enc(X509_CINF, X509_CINF)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CINF)
// x509_new_null returns a new |X509| object where the |cert_info|, |sig_alg|,
// and |signature| fields are not yet filled in.
static X509 *x509_new_null(void) {
X509 *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(X509));
if (ret == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
ret->references = 1;
ret->ex_pathlen = -1;
CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&ret->ex_data);
CRYPTO_MUTEX_init(&ret->lock);
return ret;
}
X509 *X509_new(void) {
X509 *ret = x509_new_null();
if (ret == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
ret->cert_info = X509_CINF_new();
ret->sig_alg = X509_ALGOR_new();
ret->signature = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new();
if (ret->cert_info == NULL || ret->sig_alg == NULL ||
ret->signature == NULL) {
X509_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
return ret;
}
void X509_free(X509 *x509) {
if (x509 == NULL || !CRYPTO_refcount_dec_and_test_zero(&x509->references)) {
return;
}
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, x509, &x509->ex_data);
X509_CINF_free(x509->cert_info);
X509_ALGOR_free(x509->sig_alg);
ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(x509->signature);
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(x509->skid);
AUTHORITY_KEYID_free(x509->akid);
CRL_DIST_POINTS_free(x509->crldp);
GENERAL_NAMES_free(x509->altname);
NAME_CONSTRAINTS_free(x509->nc);
X509_CERT_AUX_free(x509->aux);
CRYPTO_MUTEX_cleanup(&x509->lock);
OPENSSL_free(x509);
}
static X509 *x509_parse(CBS *cbs, CRYPTO_BUFFER *buf) {
CBS cert, tbs, sigalg, sig;
if (!CBS_get_asn1(cbs, &cert, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
// Bound the length to comfortably fit in an int. Lengths in this
// module often omit overflow checks.
CBS_len(&cert) > INT_MAX / 2 ||
!CBS_get_asn1_element(&cert, &tbs, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
!CBS_get_asn1_element(&cert, &sigalg, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_DECODE_ERROR);
return NULL;
}
// For just the signature field, we accept non-minimal BER lengths, though not
// indefinite-length encoding. See b/18228011.
//
// TODO(crbug.com/boringssl/354): Switch the affected callers to convert the
// certificate before parsing and then remove this workaround.
CBS_ASN1_TAG tag;
size_t header_len;
int indefinite;
if (!CBS_get_any_ber_asn1_element(&cert, &sig, &tag, &header_len,
/*out_ber_found=*/NULL,
&indefinite) ||
tag != CBS_ASN1_BITSTRING || indefinite || //
!CBS_skip(&sig, header_len) || //
CBS_len(&cert) != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_DECODE_ERROR);
return NULL;
}
X509 *ret = x509_new_null();
if (ret == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
// TODO(crbug.com/boringssl/443): When the rest of the library is decoupled
// from the tasn_*.c implementation, replace this with |CBS|-based functions.
const uint8_t *inp = CBS_data(&tbs);
if (ASN1_item_ex_d2i((ASN1_VALUE **)&ret->cert_info, &inp, CBS_len(&tbs),
ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CINF), /*tag=*/-1,
/*aclass=*/0, /*opt=*/0, buf) <= 0 ||
inp != CBS_data(&tbs) + CBS_len(&tbs)) {
goto err;
}
inp = CBS_data(&sigalg);
ret->sig_alg = d2i_X509_ALGOR(NULL, &inp, CBS_len(&sigalg));
if (ret->sig_alg == NULL || inp != CBS_data(&sigalg) + CBS_len(&sigalg)) {
goto err;
}
inp = CBS_data(&sig);
ret->signature = c2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING(NULL, &inp, CBS_len(&sig));
if (ret->signature == NULL || inp != CBS_data(&sig) + CBS_len(&sig)) {
goto err;
}
// The version must be one of v1(0), v2(1), or v3(2).
long version = X509_VERSION_1;
if (ret->cert_info->version != NULL) {
version = ASN1_INTEGER_get(ret->cert_info->version);
// TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/364): |X509_VERSION_1| should
// also be rejected here. This means an explicitly-encoded X.509v1
// version. v1 is DEFAULT, so DER requires it be omitted.
if (version < X509_VERSION_1 || version > X509_VERSION_3) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_INVALID_VERSION);
goto err;
}
}
// Per RFC 5280, section 4.1.2.8, these fields require v2 or v3.
if (version == X509_VERSION_1 && (ret->cert_info->issuerUID != NULL ||
ret->cert_info->subjectUID != NULL)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_INVALID_FIELD_FOR_VERSION);
goto err;
}
// Per RFC 5280, section 4.1.2.9, extensions require v3.
if (version != X509_VERSION_3 && ret->cert_info->extensions != NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_INVALID_FIELD_FOR_VERSION);
goto err;
}
return ret;
err:
X509_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
X509 *d2i_X509(X509 **out, const uint8_t **inp, long len) {
X509 *ret = NULL;
if (len < 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
goto err;
}
CBS cbs;
CBS_init(&cbs, *inp, (size_t)len);
ret = x509_parse(&cbs, NULL);
if (ret == NULL) {
goto err;
}
*inp = CBS_data(&cbs);
err:
if (out != NULL) {
X509_free(*out);
*out = ret;
}
return ret;
}
int i2d_X509(X509 *x509, uint8_t **outp) {
if (x509 == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_MISSING_VALUE);
return -1;
}
CBB cbb, cert;
if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 64) || //
!CBB_add_asn1(&cbb, &cert, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
goto err;
}
// TODO(crbug.com/boringssl/443): When the rest of the library is decoupled
// from the tasn_*.c implementation, replace this with |CBS|-based functions.
uint8_t *out;
int len = i2d_X509_CINF(x509->cert_info, NULL);
if (len < 0 || //
!CBB_add_space(&cert, &out, (size_t)len) ||
i2d_X509_CINF(x509->cert_info, &out) != len) {
goto err;
}
len = i2d_X509_ALGOR(x509->sig_alg, NULL);
if (len < 0 || //
!CBB_add_space(&cert, &out, (size_t)len) ||
i2d_X509_ALGOR(x509->sig_alg, &out) != len) {
goto err;
}
len = i2d_ASN1_BIT_STRING(x509->signature, NULL);
if (len < 0 || //
!CBB_add_space(&cert, &out, (size_t)len) ||
i2d_ASN1_BIT_STRING(x509->signature, &out) != len) {
goto err;
}
return CBB_finish_i2d(&cbb, outp);
err:
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
return -1;
}
static int x509_new_cb(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it) {
*pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)X509_new();
return *pval != NULL;
}
static void x509_free_cb(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it) {
X509_free((X509 *)*pval);
*pval = NULL;
}
static int x509_d2i_cb(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
const ASN1_ITEM *it, int opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx) {
if (len < 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
return 0;
}
CBS cbs;
CBS_init(&cbs, *in, len);
if (opt && !CBS_peek_asn1_tag(&cbs, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
return -1;
}
X509 *ret = x509_parse(&cbs, NULL);
if (ret == NULL) {
return 0;
}
*in = CBS_data(&cbs);
X509_free((X509 *)*pval);
*pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)ret;
return 1;
}
static int x509_i2d_cb(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
const ASN1_ITEM *it) {
return i2d_X509((X509 *)*pval, out);
}
static const ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS x509_extern_funcs = {
x509_new_cb,
x509_free_cb,
x509_d2i_cb,
x509_i2d_cb,
};
IMPLEMENT_EXTERN_ASN1(X509, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, x509_extern_funcs)
X509 *X509_dup(X509 *x509) {
uint8_t *der = NULL;
int len = i2d_X509(x509, &der);
if (len < 0) {
return NULL;
}
const uint8_t *inp = der;
X509 *ret = d2i_X509(NULL, &inp, len);
OPENSSL_free(der);
return ret;
}
X509 *X509_parse_from_buffer(CRYPTO_BUFFER *buf) {
CBS cbs;
CBS_init(&cbs, CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(buf), CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(buf));
X509 *ret = x509_parse(&cbs, buf);
if (ret == NULL || CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
X509_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
return ret;
}
int X509_up_ref(X509 *x) {
CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&x->references);
return 1;
}
int X509_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused,
CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused,
CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) {
return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index_ex(&g_ex_data_class, argl, argp, free_func);
}
int X509_set_ex_data(X509 *r, int idx, void *arg) {
return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx, arg));
}
void *X509_get_ex_data(X509 *r, int idx) {
return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx));
}
// X509_AUX ASN1 routines. X509_AUX is the name given to a certificate with
// extra info tagged on the end. Since these functions set how a certificate
// is trusted they should only be used when the certificate comes from a
// reliable source such as local storage.
X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length) {
const unsigned char *q = *pp;
X509 *ret;
int freeret = 0;
if (!a || *a == NULL) {
freeret = 1;
}
ret = d2i_X509(a, &q, length);
// If certificate unreadable then forget it
if (!ret) {
return NULL;
}
// update length
length -= q - *pp;
// Parse auxiliary information if there is any.
if (length > 0 && !d2i_X509_CERT_AUX(&ret->aux, &q, length)) {
goto err;
}
*pp = q;
return ret;
err:
if (freeret) {
X509_free(ret);
if (a) {
*a = NULL;
}
}
return NULL;
}
// Serialize trusted certificate to *pp or just return the required buffer
// length if pp == NULL. We ultimately want to avoid modifying *pp in the
// error path, but that depends on similar hygiene in lower-level functions.
// Here we avoid compounding the problem.
static int i2d_x509_aux_internal(X509 *a, unsigned char **pp) {
int length, tmplen;
unsigned char *start = pp != NULL ? *pp : NULL;
assert(pp == NULL || *pp != NULL);
// This might perturb *pp on error, but fixing that belongs in i2d_X509()
// not here. It should be that if a == NULL length is zero, but we check
// both just in case.
length = i2d_X509(a, pp);
if (length <= 0 || a == NULL) {
return length;
}
if (a->aux != NULL) {
tmplen = i2d_X509_CERT_AUX(a->aux, pp);
if (tmplen < 0) {
if (start != NULL) {
*pp = start;
}
return tmplen;
}
length += tmplen;
}
return length;
}
// Serialize trusted certificate to *pp, or just return the required buffer
// length if pp == NULL.
//
// When pp is not NULL, but *pp == NULL, we allocate the buffer, but since
// we're writing two ASN.1 objects back to back, we can't have i2d_X509() do
// the allocation, nor can we allow i2d_X509_CERT_AUX() to increment the
// allocated buffer.
int i2d_X509_AUX(X509 *a, unsigned char **pp) {
int length;
unsigned char *tmp;
// Buffer provided by caller
if (pp == NULL || *pp != NULL) {
return i2d_x509_aux_internal(a, pp);
}
// Obtain the combined length
if ((length = i2d_x509_aux_internal(a, NULL)) <= 0) {
return length;
}
// Allocate requisite combined storage
*pp = tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(length);
if (tmp == NULL) {
return -1; // Push error onto error stack?
}
// Encode, but keep *pp at the originally malloced pointer
length = i2d_x509_aux_internal(a, &tmp);
if (length <= 0) {
OPENSSL_free(*pp);
*pp = NULL;
}
return length;
}
int i2d_re_X509_tbs(X509 *x509, unsigned char **outp) {
asn1_encoding_clear(&x509->cert_info->enc);
return i2d_X509_CINF(x509->cert_info, outp);
}
int i2d_X509_tbs(X509 *x509, unsigned char **outp) {
return i2d_X509_CINF(x509->cert_info, outp);
}
int X509_set1_signature_algo(X509 *x509, const X509_ALGOR *algo) {
X509_ALGOR *copy1 = X509_ALGOR_dup(algo);
X509_ALGOR *copy2 = X509_ALGOR_dup(algo);
if (copy1 == NULL || copy2 == NULL) {
X509_ALGOR_free(copy1);
X509_ALGOR_free(copy2);
return 0;
}
X509_ALGOR_free(x509->sig_alg);
x509->sig_alg = copy1;
X509_ALGOR_free(x509->cert_info->signature);
x509->cert_info->signature = copy2;
return 1;
}
int X509_set1_signature_value(X509 *x509, const uint8_t *sig, size_t sig_len) {
if (!ASN1_STRING_set(x509->signature, sig, sig_len)) {
return 0;
}
x509->signature->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07);
x509->signature->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT;
return 1;
}
void X509_get0_signature(const ASN1_BIT_STRING **psig, const X509_ALGOR **palg,
const X509 *x) {
if (psig) {
*psig = x->signature;
}
if (palg) {
*palg = x->sig_alg;
}
}
int X509_get_signature_nid(const X509 *x) {
return OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm);
}